


**Fact**

The perception of Gorbachev as the main peacemaker was increased by statements he made in December 1988. He said that Soviet forces would be reduced by 500,000 over the following two years, and also that Soviet troops would be gradually withdrawn from the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In both cases, Gorbachev stated these would not require any reciprocal moves from the US. Significantly, perhaps, Gorbachev made these announcements without first discussing them with the Soviet defence minister.

**Question**

What were the four summits that took place between the Soviet Union and the USA in the years 1985–88?

**George Bush (b. 1924)** George H. W. Bush became vice-president to Reagan in 1980. During this period, he was involved in the Iran-Contragate scandal, when non-lethal aid voted for by Congress was secretly given to the Contras in Nicaragua and to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. He was elected president in 1988, and took advantage of Soviet weaknesses and Gorbachev's reforms to use US troops to overthrow the government of Panama and, in 1991, to invade Iraq in the Gulf War.

**Moscow**

The next summit meeting took place in Moscow in May 1988. Prior to this, Gorbachev had taken another step towards easing tensions between East and West by announcing that the Soviet Union would withdraw its forces from Afghanistan without insisting on any guarantees on the type of government which might come to power in that country. This had long been insisted on by the US, and had been resisted by previous Soviet leaders – including Gorbachev himself at first. By April 1988, an international conference in Geneva had resulted in an agreement to end all foreign involvement in the Afghan civil war. Gorbachev even hinted that Soviet troops might soon be withdrawn from Eastern Europe. By February 1989, after almost ten years of fighting, the last units of the Red Army had left Afghanistan.

Despite this, the Moscow Summit achieved little as, once again, arguments about the Star Wars project blocked any agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. By then, however, Gorbachev had effectively destroyed Reagan's attempt to depict the Soviet Union as an 'evil empire', and Reagan himself had stated publicly that his earlier view of the USSR had changed, saying that the phrase belonged to 'another time, another era'. However, vice-president Bush commented that 'the Cold War is not over'.

In fact, Gorbachev was soon scoring higher in US opinion polls than US politicians. What became known as 'Gorbimania' hit Western Europe, as people responded to his attempts to end the arms race and his talk of a 'common European home'.

**From Reagan to Bush**

The November 1988 presidential elections in the US had been won by vice-president **George Bush**. After he took over in January 1989, the pace of improvement in US–Soviet relations slackened off at first, as Bush believed Reagan had made too many concessions. In addition, since the mid 1980s, the US position had been strengthened by a series of developments: new and advanced missiles had been placed in Western Europe, the SDI project continued, and the US had taken various military initiatives to counter political developments overseas – Grenada had been invaded, while support had been given to both the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and the Contras in Nicaragua. In addition, the US was increasingly aware of the political and economic problems of the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. Many were in debt, and trade with Western states had made them increasingly dependent on the West. These problems were used as leverage to push for further Soviet concessions, in the knowledge that for Gorbachev's economic reforms to work, the USSR could not afford to match the SDI project. The US also continued to argue that the various agreements did not mean the Cold War was over. In particular, the situation in Eastern Europe, with its links to the USSR, was seen as a major stumbling block.

However, in July 1989, Bush met Gorbachev and was reassured by his statement that the USSR had no desire to challenge the USA's global dominance. This allowed the thaw in Soviet–US relations to resume. Soon, James Baker, the new US secretary of state, developed a good relationship with Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs. By now, the Soviet Union was desperate for US financial assistance, and Shevardnadze was instructed to indicate that the USSR was ready to sign the START treaty without any US concessions. In fact, he was criticised by Soviet hardliners for agreeing that the USA could retain 880 submarine-launched Cruise missiles.

**How important were Soviet economic problems?****The Gorbachev Doctrine**

According to historian and former US ambassador Raymond Garthoff, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was part of what he has called the 'Gorbachev Doctrine' – a clear policy of disengaging from involvement in the Developing World, in order to avoid any confrontation with the US.

However, Gorbachev's actions here, and in relation to nuclear disarmament and Eastern Europe, have also been described as a 'diplomacy of despair'. This argument maintains that, because of its economic difficulties, the Soviet Union had to make more defence cuts than the US, despite being in an inferior military position. Thus, while the attitudes and policies of individuals such as Gorbachev and Reagan were clearly significant factors in the final stages of the Cold War, there were also important long-term factors involved.

**SOURCE D**

The West did not, as is widely believed, win the Cold War through geopolitical containment and military deterrence. Nor was the Cold War won by the Reagan military build up and the Reagan Doctrine. ... Instead, 'victory' for the West came when a new generation of Soviet leaders realised how badly their system at home and their policies abroad had failed. What containment did was to successfully stymie Moscow's attempts to advance Soviet hegemony. Over four decades it performed the historic function of holding Soviet power in check until the internal seeds of destruction within the Soviet Union and its empire could mature. At this point, however, it was Gorbachev who brought the Cold War to an end.

Garthoff, R. L. 'Why did the Cold War Arise and Why Did it End?'. In Hogan, M. J. (ed.). 1992. *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications*. 1992. Cambridge, UK. Cambridge University Press. p. 129.

By the time of Brezhnev's death in 1982, the USSR seemed to be more powerful and secure than at any point in its short history. It was under Brezhnev that the Soviet Union finally achieved 'parity' in several areas of nuclear weaponry and technology. At the same time, the foreign policy pursued under Brezhnev had resulted in many more countries with friendly links to the Soviet Union, thus reducing the USSR's global isolation.

However, the deployment of large resources to achieve these results had a very negative impact on the Soviet economy. Most worrying was that Soviet technology was in many vital areas falling behind that of the West. As a result, industrial productivity in the USSR was declining. By the time Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the Soviet economy was in serious trouble, forcing him to make agreements with the West.

**Fact**

Garthoff sees the Gorbachev Doctrine as being achieved by working with the US in order to sponsor the peaceful settlement of conflicts in the Developing World, based on a desire for security via co-operation and improved relations.

**Question**

How did the weaknesses of the Soviet economy affect Gorbachev's foreign policy?

**Fact**

Not only was there stagnation as far as consumer goods and living standards were concerned, there was a general slowing down of the whole domestic economy of the USSR.

**Fact**

Walesa was strongly influenced by his Catholic religious views, and was supported by the Catholic Church both within and outside Poland.

**Fact**

Gorbachev stressed the common history and culture of Europe, and argued that the security of Europe as a whole could only be resolved by pan-European initiatives and bodies.

**Fact**

The governments of the GDR, Bulgaria, Romania and Czechoslovakia tried hard at first to limit news of Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union. The East German government actually censored Soviet publications to keep Gorbachev's statements and policies from their citizens.

Several historians critical of the 'Reagan victory' view thus point out that, as these problems existed before Reagan became president, the end of the Cold War was down to other factors, such as internal Soviet weaknesses and/or the earlier US/Western Cold War strategies of containment and détente.

## How important was the collapse of Eastern European regimes in ending the Cold War?

### The collapse of Eastern Europe, 1988–89

In addition to the economic problems of the USSR, developments in Eastern Europe also played a key role in the ending of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR. In particular, the period from the late 1970s/early 1980s saw the re-emergence of a new nationalism in many of the Soviet Union's European satellites. The first country to show signs of this was Poland, where dissatisfaction with the poor economic situation in the country had led to industrial unrest and strikes. In Gdansk, a successful strike in the shipyards led to the formation of an independent trade union known as Solidarity, under the leadership of Lech Walesa.

By 1981, Solidarity had claimed a membership of ten million – much to the concern of Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders. In December 1981, a section of the Polish army had been able to get General Jaruzelski installed as prime minister. Jaruzelski, who wanted to maintain links with Moscow, had declared martial law, banned Solidarity and arrested thousands of activists. Order had been restored by 1983, but the economic problems and declining living standards continued, and in the late 1980s trouble reappeared.

Gorbachev made it increasingly clear that he was unwilling to use military force to maintain Soviet influence over the Soviet satellites. Part of his New Thinking was based on the idea that the Soviet Union, and Eastern and Western Europe, shared a 'common European home'.

Of particular importance was Gorbachev's public abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine in March 1985. He made it clear that Soviet troops would not be sent into any Eastern European state, either to defend an existing regime or to crush reform communists or mass popular movements. This was reiterated at a Warsaw Pact meeting in April 1985. Yet when Gorbachev came to power in 1985, most regimes in the Soviet bloc seemed reasonably secure and stable. Many of Gorbachev's critics soon blamed the collapse of these states – in a period of only four years – on Gorbachev's policies.

On 7 December 1988, Gorbachev made a speech to the United Nations in which he announced that the number of Soviet troops committed to the Warsaw Pact would be cut by 500,000, and reiterated that he would not use the Soviet army to maintain control of satellite countries.

As part of his approach, Gorbachev also encouraged the policies of *perestroika*, *glasnost* and *demokratizasiya* (see page 191) in the Soviet Union's Eastern European satellites. Some of these were similar to the ideas developed earlier by reform communists in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the 1960s and 1970s. While many citizens in these countries were keen to enjoy the new freedoms being allowed in the USSR, several Eastern European governments had grave doubts. However, the ruling communists in Hungary and Poland welcomed the new opportunities for reform. Soon, Eastern Europe saw the rise of mass movements which, as

well as calling for economic reforms, also demanded greater democracy and various versions of the earlier Czechoslovakian 'Prague Spring' of 1968, which had tried to establish 'socialism with a human face'. Gorbachev's speech to the UN in December 1988, when he declared that ideology should play a smaller part in foreign affairs, and announced major reductions of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, also encouraged hopes for reform. Some elements in these popular grass-roots movements, however, wanted to go further – to re-establish the power of the Church and to restore capitalism.

### The events of 1989

#### Poland

In Poland, Solidarity was legalised in January 1989 and in April it agreed a package of political and economic reforms with the government. These included elections to be held in June, which resulted in a clear victory for Solidarity. In August 1989, the new Polish parliament elected the first non-communist prime minister to rule in Eastern Europe in over 40 years. The significant aspect of these developments was that Gorbachev, in line with his earlier statements, did not intervene to support the old communist regime. The movements in the rest of Eastern Europe were thus encouraged to continue their demands.

#### Hungary

In Hungary, reform communists had been carrying out their own Gorbachev-style policies for some time. These moves increased in the late 1980s, and in 1989 it was agreed that multi-party elections would be held. Gorbachev accepted these developments in both Hungary and Poland.

It took developments in the GDR to accelerate the pace of change in the rest of Eastern Europe, but it was Hungary's decision, in August 1989, to open its border with Austria that sparked off the crisis in East Germany. By September 1989, thousands of East Germans were crossing to West Germany via Hungary and Austria, provoking an economic crisis similar to the one that had led to the building of the Berlin Wall.

#### East Germany

In East Germany, Honecker – unlike Ulbricht in 1961 – could not rely on Soviet support. Although the East German economy was relatively successful, and, like all Soviet bloc countries, provided its citizens with cheap transport, electricity and gas, living standards in many areas were below those enjoyed in the West. Demonstrations in support of democracy spread across the GDR.

On 18 October, Honecker resigned as leader of the communist party and was replaced by Egon Krenz. However, the demonstrations – many of them led by a group known as New Forum – grew even bigger, culminating in a massive protest in East Berlin on 4 November, attended by almost 500,000 people. Gorbachev then made it clear to the GDR that it should form closer ties with West Germany, pointing out that the USSR could no longer afford to subsidise its economy.

On 7 November, the government of the GDR resigned and, on 8 November, Krenz decided to open the Berlin Wall. Thousands of people rushed to the checkpoints and poured through. Soon, people from both East and West Berlin began to demolish the Berlin Wall, which, since its construction in 1961, had come to symbolise the Cold War.

**Fact**

The Hungarian reformers went beyond liberalisation, and began to encourage nationalism – for instance, during the memorials held on 16 June to commemorate the 1956 reformer Imre Nagy (see page 113).

**Fact**

Gorbachev's only intervention in Eastern Europe was to continue to encourage liberal reforms. Although Gorbachev hoped that the new governments would be made up of reform communists or socialists, who would establish democratic socialism in Eastern Europe, the only certainty in 1989 was that the old-style communist governments had gone.

**Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria**

The events in East Germany stimulated mass protests in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. In Czechoslovakia, people were reminded of the Prague Spring of 1968. The communist government resigned and a multi-party system was established. As a result of this 'Velvet Revolution', led mainly by the Civic Forum group, Vaclav Havel, a dissident and playwright, became president. On 27 October, the countries of the Warsaw Pact, including the USSR, issued a statement condemning the 1968 invasion, promising never again to interfere in the affairs of member states, and guaranteeing that there would be no military intervention to support unpopular governments. In Bulgaria, too, mass demonstrations led to the government's resignation and a multi-party democracy.

**Romania**

The one exception to these peaceful revolutions was Romania, where Nicolae Ceausescu, the country's leader, tried to use the security forces to crush the demonstrators. On Christmas Eve, the US ambassador in Moscow signalled that there would be no objections if Gorbachev sent in Soviet troops to help the Romanian army against Ceausescu. This suggestion, and the Soviet refusal to intervene, were significant indications that the Cold War was virtually over. Ceausescu and his wife tried to flee, but were arrested by the army, and were executed on Christmas Day 1989.

More significantly, the Soviet Union had allowed the disappearance of a security belt which had been the foundation and main aim of its foreign policy since 1945, and which had played a large part in the start of the Cold War. The hardline communists in these Eastern European states, who had used a form of nationalism to bolster their regimes, soon found themselves outflanked and overtaken by nationalists on the right, who began to stir up ethnic prejudices against minorities such as the Roma and the Sinti, and Jewish people.

**Collapse of the Soviet bloc**

This new Soviet policy of non-intervention was the result of a combination of Gorbachev's belief in democracy and his recognition that the Soviet Union was politically unable to intervene. The collapse of the Soviet bloc was a clear indication of the serious decline of the USSR, both internally and externally, by the end of the 1980s. In fact, all these Eastern European states had been heavily in debt to the Soviet Union, thus adding to its own economic problems.

**SOURCE E**

At the beginning of 1989 the Communists had been in complete – and seemingly permanent – control of Eastern Europe. At the end of the year, they were gone. Democratic coalitions, promising free elections in the immediate future, had taken place in East Berlin, Prague, Budapest, Warsaw and even Bucharest. ... As a result, the Warsaw Pact had been, in effect, dismantled. The Soviet Union had withdrawn inside its borders. The Cold War in Europe was over.

Ambrose, S. 1991. *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*. London, UK. Penguin. p. 378.

**The collapse of the Soviet bloc was a clear indication of the serious decline of the USSR, both internally and externally. In fact, all these Eastern European states had been heavily in debt to the Soviet Union.**

Most commentators welcomed these developments, but a small minority, while supporting the reforms, nonetheless urged caution. The historian Eric Hobsbawm, for example, warned that the collapse of one-party regimes in Eastern Europe would not necessarily result in tolerant and popular regimes. In particular, he pointed out that before 1945, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, the governments in that area had been authoritarian and often racist, especially towards their Jewish, and the Sinti and Roma, minorities.

He also commented that, as a condition for receiving loans from the West, the new governments would be applying neo-capitalist policies in relatively backward economies, and this would cause great hardship for the majority of their populations. Both jobs and social services would be cut. However, the changes would also provide opportunities for a small minority to become very wealthy.

**The final act, December 1989–1991****The Malta Summit**

The collapse of the Eastern European regimes – and hence of the Soviet buffer-zone – played a big part in ending the Cold War. At the Malta Summit in December 1989, Gorbachev and Bush officially declared the end of the Cold War. This symbolic statement came about when Gorbachev announced that the USSR no longer saw the US as an enemy.

The US offered economic help, and the two parties reached informal agreements on the future of Eastern Europe, Germany and the Baltic republics. On the latter issue, Gorbachev was prepared to consider a loosening of their ties to the USSR but not, at first, their independence. They also agreed to work towards reducing the size of conventional forces in Europe. After the Malta Summit, Shevardnadze claimed the Cold War had been 'buried at the bottom of the Mediterranean'.


**Germany**

The question of Germany remained a serious security concern for the Soviet Union. At first Gorbachev hoped to avoid German reunification, believing that, with the uncertain political and diplomatic policies likely to emerge in Eastern Europe, a divided Germany would be less of a possible threat. For a time, both he and Margaret Thatcher – the 'new right' prime minister of Britain who had worked closely with Reagan – tried to restrain the US push for rapid reunification. There were even calls for Soviet troops to remain in Germany for a time. These were supported by the new post-communist regime in Poland. The Soviet Union was also concerned that NATO would extend its membership eastwards, right up to the Soviet Union's borders. However, by February 1990, Gorbachev had accepted that it was up to the Germans to decide whether and when they wanted reunification.

In May, the GDR signed a reunification treaty, and the West German Deutschmark became the common currency in July. In May 1990, Helmut Kohl visited the Soviet Union. The result was Gorbachev's acceptance of reunification in return for German economic aid for the USSR, German acceptance of Poland's western borders, and informal guarantees of Soviet security. In the end, under strong pressure from the West and in a position of economic weakness, Gorbachev finally agreed to reunification of Germany in September 1990. This formally took place on 3 October 1990, and soon came to symbolise the end of the division of Europe itself, which had existed since 1947.

**Fact**

Gorbachev hoped that, if reunification took place, the new Germany would remain neutral; but US president Bush and Kohl, the West German chancellor, made it clear that a united Germany would join NATO.



Sections of the Berlin Wall are removed by GDR border soldiers in November 1989

Though Gorbachev did obtain some concessions – the former West German army would be reduced, and no NATO forces would be deployed in the former GDR – he was also beginning to negotiate on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from states in Eastern Europe. To ease this process, the US offered much-needed financial assistance. Once again, Gorbachev acted without prior discussion with the Soviet foreign minister or the military.

In November 1990, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was signed, which led to a reduction in troop deployments. At the same time, further talks began on the reduction of nuclear weapons. This resulted in the START treaty, which was signed at the Moscow Summit in July 1991, ten years after it was first drawn up. Considerable cuts in the size of US and Soviet strategic nuclear stockpiles were agreed, and talks for a START II treaty were begun.

### The collapse of the Soviet Union

Initially, when some Soviet republics – especially the Baltic republics – began to push for independence, the US stated that it was not in favour of the break-up of the Soviet Union, and seemed to prefer Gorbachev's plans for a looser confederation to those of Boris Yeltsin, the newly elected president of the Russian republic – the largest and most important of the 15 republics that made up the USSR. Yeltsin was pushing for a separate Russian republic. Consequently, when violent clashes occurred in Lithuania and Latvia in January 1991 between protestors and Soviet security forces, the US did not break off relations with the Soviet Union.

The CFE treaty was speeded up, resulting in the US announcing \$1.5 billion worth of credits for the USSR to purchase grain, but tensions began to resurface.

### Fact


The US was not in favour of the break-up of the Soviet Union, partly because it preferred to deal with one central power and feared the possible consequences of the instability that might result from any break up; and partly because it wanted Soviet support for its Gulf War against Iraq (Iraq was allied to the Soviet Union, and several thousand Soviet troops were stationed there).

This stemmed from US insistence that significant economic aid would not be forthcoming unless the Soviet Union moved to a market, or capitalist, economy. Matters were made worse when the KGB claimed to have evidence of US attempts to bring about the disintegration of the USSR.

However, some developments under Gorbachev – especially the loss of Eastern Europe and the acceptance of Soviet nuclear inferiority – continued to alarm his critics in the Soviet leadership. These fears were underlined in July 1991, when the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, leaving NATO unchallenged. In addition, his economic policies had not resulted in any significant improvement, and both Gorbachev and his government, while popular abroad, were losing support at home.

A group of political and military leaders, who were also opposed to plans to give more power to the Soviet republics, decided to overthrow Gorbachev. A new draft Union Treaty, granting such powers, had been given mass support in a referendum in March 1991; the plotters feared it might result in the disintegration of the USSR.

A map showing the individual states that emerged from the former Soviet Union



In August 1991, these hardline 'Stalinist' plotters launched their attempted coup while Gorbachev was on holiday. At first, Bush seemed prepared to accept the coup, but he changed his mind and made contact with Yeltsin. The coup failed because the bulk of the army and security forces refused to support it, while Yeltsin soon put himself at the head of popular protests.

Though Gorbachev remained as Soviet president, his position was increasingly undermined by Yeltsin, who used his control of Russia to hasten the collapse of the Soviet Union. In December 1991 Russia, along with the important republics of Belorussia and the Ukraine, declared the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Perhaps significantly, they informed Bush of their decision before Gorbachev. On 25 December 1991, Gorbachev used a TV broadcast to announce his resignation as president of the Soviet Union.

With this step, the Soviet Union – which had already broken up in practice – was declared formally to have ended. This geopolitical victory topped off the three other aspects of the 'triumph of the West' in the final stages of the Cold War: the ideological Cold War had ended with Gorbachev's speech to the UN in December 1988; the military Cold War had ended at the CSCE talks in Paris in November 1990, where Bush and Gorbachev signed the CFE Treaty; and the economic Cold War had ended at the Malta Summit in December 1989 (see page 201).

### How did Gorbachev help end Cold War tensions in Asia, the Americas and Africa?

As well as disengaging from Eastern Europe, Gorbachev decided to withdraw from Afghanistan, and to 'write off' client regimes in the rest of the world. In particular, he reduced Soviet support for the Cuban economy and Cuba's interventionist foreign policy. This rapidly reduced Cuba's ability to support sympathetic governments and movements. In the Americas, Castro had to reduce support for the Nicaraguan government and for the left-wing rebels in El Salvador.

Even today, the US maintains its hostility to Cuba, which – still under Castro's leadership – continues to be a 'communist' island in the western hemisphere. Yet, despite being deprived of economic and political allies, Cuba still acts as an irritant to the USA, and an almost-forgotten footnote to the Cold War.

Gorbachev's new policy also affected Cuba's world role in relation to Africa. He negotiated an agreement with the US concerning the civil war in Angola, which had been ongoing since 1975. In 1991, Cuban troops were withdrawn and the civil war was suspended.

In the Horn of Africa, the Soviet Union also ended its support of Ethiopia, with Cuban combat troops again being withdrawn. The US then ended its support of Somalia, and the war between Ethiopia and Somalia came to an end. Both these military conflicts, and Cuban military involvement, had played a major role in the deteriorating relations between the US and the USSR in the late 1970s. The ending of these 'hot spots' contributed to the eventual conclusion of the Second Cold War.

#### Question

How did the collapse of the USSR in 1991 affect Cuba?

## Was the end of the Cold War also the end of the 'Great Contest'?

### The end of history?

The Cold War was clearly at an end, as one of the two superpowers no longer existed. This left the USA with supreme global power after almost 75 years of struggle. Some historians, such as Richard Crockatt, have seen 1991 as the end of what has been described as 'the 50 Years' War' between the US and the USSR – a war that had clearly been won by the US, with its greater economic, technological and military strength.

Other commentators have argued that the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union had an even wider significance, in that these events heralded the end of the 'Great Contest', which had begun in 1917. Or, as expressed by Francis Fukuyama (a US official), the 'end of history' had arrived, resulting in the final victory of 'liberal' capitalism over Marxism and communist or radical movements based to one degree or another on this political philosophy. Certainly, communism remained the official ideology of only a handful of states: apart from China (which was quickly applying capitalist economic policies), the only other communist states were Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam, and Vietnam had also begun moving towards capitalist economic policies once aid from the Soviet Union had ceased.

### Conclusion – US power

Certainly, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, only one superpower from the Cold War remained. Since then, historians have been debating the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union and thus the end of the Cold War.

In 1992, George Kennan – in many ways the architect of US policy during the Cold War – claimed that the US did not have the power to bring about changes within the USSR. Yet his policy had originally been based on the belief that containment would not just counter Soviet influence in the world, but would also help undermine the Soviet system.

This cartoon about the end of the Cold War appeared in the Guardian newspaper in Britain in June 1988

